Force Majeure Ruling in Miami Should Change How Contracts Are Written

In what is reported in the Daily Business Review to be the first ruling of its kind in Miami-Dade County, a popular retail store on Lincoln Road in Miami Beach is required to pay rent despite hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Guess? Retail Inc., the clothing store, alleged that the COVID-19 pandemic left it unable to pay its rent. The retailer refused to pay after it had to close its operations around March of last year — something Guess said was done to protect the health and safety of customers and employees, and comply with government safety guidelines. The Denison Corporation, a Miami Beach-based family business, sued in May for $291,162 in rent and other expenses owed over three months. But Guess turned around and countersued Denison. The retailer sought a refund on some payments it had made since March 17 and said it should get a break going forward, according to the suit.

The lease states that the term force majeure encompasses, “acts of God, labor disputes (whether lawful or not), material or labor shortages, restrictions by any governmental authority, civil riots, floods, or other cause beyond the control of the party asserting the existence of force majeure.” It also said, “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this lease, tenant shall not be excused from payment of base rent, operating costs, or any other sum due under this lease by reason of force majeure.”

Miami-Dade Circuit Court Judge Peter Lopez shot down Guess’ countersuit, saying the lease is clear that rent still has to be paid during force majeure events, including government-imposed closures for the pandemic. A force majeure clause is common in leases and can sometimes allow a party to not fulfill their contract when there is a circumstance beyond their control or an “act of God.”

At the time this decision was entered, it was reported to be a case of the first impression. It is likely to be relied upon by other jurists as litigation regarding force majeure provisions move through the Miami-Dade court system. The ruling is a clear win for landlords who still need that income to pay their taxes (no rebate there), expenses and to continue operations. It is hoped that parties facing these issues will attempt to work together to avoid these sorts of lawsuits, since the pandemic has caused hardships for everyone. In the meantime, lawsuits such as these will change the way all contracts are written in the future to make sure that pandemics are specifically named as an example of a force majeure incident and where the risk of such a situation should fall.

If you are interested in receiving Judge Lopez’ decision or wish to discuss the issue of force majeure further, please feel free to reach out to me at blog@miamimaritimelaw.co or 305.377.3700.

Prevailing-Party: Revisiting the Right to Attorney's Fees Under the Contract in Florida

A little reported decision with big impact has just come down from the Florida Supreme Court. In Levy v. Levy, No. SC20-1195 (Oct. 7, 2021), the Florida Supreme Court ruled in a marital case that Florida Statute section 57.105(7) was not applicable in a prevailing party attorney’s fee provision. In other words, just because there is a prevailing party attorney’s fee provision in a contract does not mean that the other party that becomes the prevailing party automatically get their attorney’s fees.

In Levy, the former husband filed a motion to compel the former wife to comply with a settlement agreement they had previously entered into. That agreement had a prevailing party attorney’s fee provision. Both sides sought attorney’s fees based on the clause and section 57.105(7), a statute which was thought by operation of law, converts unilateral fee provisions into reciprocal provisions. The trial court ruled against the former husband but the wife was not granted her attorney’s fees as “entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs is only contemplated against the party who is found to be in violation of th[e] Agreement.’” Id. at 3 (citation omitted). The appellate court affirmed on all issues except as to the rejection of the former wife’s request for attorney’s fees.

On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Justice J Grosshans, citing a conflict between Levy and another case, Sacket v. Sacket, 115 So. 3d 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), found that by the plain reading of section 57.105(7), it “only applies to a provision that confers on a party the right to attorney’s fees while not affording a comparable right to the other party.” Levy at 6-7. The court found that the provision in question did not confer a right to fees on one identifiable contracting party to the exclusion of the other party but instead “entitles either party to an award of attorney’s fees upon demonstrating that the other party violated the [contract].” Id. at 7. Thus, both parties had a right to attorney’s fees under the clause and thus, as there was no violation of the contract proven, no attorney’s fees were due to be awarded.

As reported in the Daily Business Review, this ruling is causing some lawyers to worry that the decision will spark a rise in frivolous litigation. This view appears correct as many now need to immediately amend their contracts to adjust to this decision. This ruling requires more contract wordsmithing in what should be a pretty straightforward prevailing party clause. You must now write that the prevailing party is either the offensive or defensive party, as failing to do so, a defensive party, like Ms. Levy, does not get her fees if she wins.

This decision is a siren call for contract redrafts, especially those with prevailing attorney’s fees provisions. If you are interested in receiving a copy of this decision or wish to discuss it further, please feel free to reach out to me at blog@miamimaritimelaw.co, lawofficesofmov@gmail.com or at 305.377.3700.

New Summary Judgment Standard in Florida--More Like the Feds

As has been expected as a result of the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in December 2020 advising its intent to change the summary judgment rule 1.510, the Court has now amended that rule as of May 1, 2021 in IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.510, 46 Fla. L. Weekly S95 (Fla. April 29, 2021). The highlights include the following:

• The Florida Supreme Court actually replaced the text of Rule 1.510 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 with a few “tweaks.”

• 1.510(a) now says that the rule will be construed “in accordance with the federal standard” meaning we need to cite to federal cases for a while.

• Rule 1.510 makes the summary judgment standard like the directed verdict standard: Both focus on “whether evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Both standards make the burden for showing a genuine issue of fact to be equal with the burden of proof at trial.

• To obtain summary judgment, it is not necessary for the non-movant to “disprove” the other side’s case (if the non-moving party has to prove “x” to win at trial, then the party moving for summary judgment can either (a) produce evidence to show that “x” is not so, or (b) that the non-movant lacks the evidence to prove “x”.

• The test for whether a genuine issue of fact exists asks the trial judge to decide whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

• The trial judge must articulate the reasons on the record for granting or denying a motion for summary judgment (the Federal rule actually makes it permissive, while 1.510(a) makes it mandatory).

• Summary judgment hearings must be set forty (40) days before the hearing (not 20 like the old rule), and responses must be issued within twenty (20) days, not five days, or two days like the old days…

My Team and I Obtain a Defense Verdict in Jones Act Case

I, my husband and the rest of our Miami team successfully defended a yacht owner against a former employee’s Jones Act negligence claim in a 7-day Zoom trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The case arose after the yacht’s chief stewardess was allegedly injured after hitting a wake while aboard the yacht’s tender during a purported sea trial of the tender. The plaintiff alleged she was in the course and scope of her employment with the yacht at the time of her accident aboard the tender and sought over $2 million in damages.

I first won the case on summary judgment, as the district court found the crewmember failed to present a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was acting within the course and scope of her employment when she was injured. The crewmember appealed that decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded the case back to the trial court, stating that in evaluating whether the crewmember was within the course and scope of her job with the yacht, the trial court needed to evaluate the case under the guidance provided in Fowler v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 638 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 1981). The Eleventh Circuit found that Fowler stands for the proposition that acts that are incidental to an employee’s work can fall within the course of her employment, even is the employee is not performing her customary job duties. Fowler, 638 F.2d at 20 (discussing the meaning of “within the scope of employment” to determine liability under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51). However, a reading of Fowler makes clear that Jones Act protections do not cover personal activity engaged in by the employee for a private purpose and having no causal relationship to her employment. Id. at 18-19.  

The Eleventh Circuit also relied on Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., L.L.C., 691 F.3d 566, 572 (5th Cir. 2012), which states that “to hold an employer vicariously liable under the Jones Act for one employee’s injury caused by the negligence of a co-employee, a plaintiff must show that the injured employee and the employee who caused the harm were both acting in the course of their employment at the time of the accident”. Again, the court focused on the course and scope of employment as it pertained to the captain and his piloting of the alleged tender during the purported sea trial at the time the plaintiff was injured.

After carefully reviewing all the evidence in the case after it was remanded for trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff had not met her burden to show that she was acting within the course and scope of her employment on the day of her accident. The court concluded that she was engaged in a family outing with the captain who was her then boyfriend, her daughter and a married couple that were personal friends of the couple. The court determined that the activity was not advancing a business interest of the yacht owner and it was not foreseeable to the yacht owner that the activity was to be engaged in by either the plaintiff or the captain. The court noted that the Jones Act does not apply to private acts by a crewmember and emphasized that the Jones Act is not a strict liability scheme.

If you are interested in receiving a copy of the Eleventh Circuit decision or wish to contact me to discuss the case further, please feel free to send me an email at blog@miamimaritimelaw.co or you can call 305.377.3700.