New Economic Loss Rule Decision in Fifth Circuit

July 29, 2011

The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently overturned a decision by the Western District of Louisiana to dismiss a plaintiff’s demand for economic losses arising from a maritime tort for failure to satisfy the physical damage requirement of the economic loss rule, as set forth in the decision Louisiana ex. rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F. 2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). Under general maritime law, there can be no recovery for economic loss without physical damage to or an invasion of a proprietary interest. Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). In Catalyst Old River Hydroelectric Limited Partnership v. Ingram Barge Co., 639 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2011), the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a physical invasion of a proprietary interest and preparations to mitigate further damages are sufficient to satisfy the economic loss rule under general maritime law.

In December 2007, two tug and barge units collided on the Mississippi River. As a result of the collision, several barges broke free and drifted down river.  One of the barges drifted into the intake channel of a hydroelectric station owned and operated by Catalyst Old River Hydroelectric Limited Partnership (“CAT”).  CAT owned the station and surrounding property necessary for its operation. There is an intake channel and a small island located in the mouth of the intake channel where the channel meets the Mississippi River. Both the channel and island were functioning elements of the hydroelectric facility and acted as a pipe to direct water into the station’s eight turbines to produce electricity.  The barge grounded on the east bank of the intake channel and lodged against the station and abutment. As a result of the barge being stuck in the channel, CAT had to reduce the flow of water into the turbines, which decreased the electricity output. This action was necessary both to prevent the barge from sinking and allow access to other equipment to remove the barge. After CAT reduced the flow of water and shut down six of its turbines, a barge crane entered the intake channel and freed it from the bank. There was no actual physical damage to the facility and normal operations resumed after the barge had been freed from the bank.

CAT filed suit in Louisiana state court against the barge companies involved in the collision (“Barge Defendants”) seeking damages for the value of the electrical power that it was unable to generate due to the barge intrusion.  The case was removed by the Barge Defendants to federal district court, where they subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all economic loss claims on the grounds that CAT sustained no physical damage and, therefore, could not recover such damages.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that the purpose of the economic loss rule is to limit the consequences of negligence and exclude indirect economic repercussions, which can be widespread and open-ended. TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1022. The Fifth Circuit also noted that in the TESTBANK decision, physical harm to or invasion of a proprietary interest is generally an appropriate condition for recovery of negligently caused economic loss. Id. The Barge Defendants argued that CAT suffered no physical harm in that neither the channel, nor any of the facilities, were damaged by the barge.  However, the Court sided with CAT in holding that the mere presence of the barge in the intake channel, which was a functioning component of the hydroelectric facility, interfered with unobstructed continuous flow of water in the channel and thus impairing the ability of the facility to operate as designed.  The Fifth Circuit noted that the intrusion was sufficient to qualify as damage to CAT’s proprietary interest and satisfied the requirements of the economic loss rule.

Not only did the Fifth Circuit hold that the intrusion of the barge in the channel interfered with the flow of water and electrical generation, it also held that the physical recovery effort to secure and remove the barge from the intake channel also required a reduction of water flow that decreased operation of the turbines.  Acts taken in mitigation to prevent permanent physical damage can also serve as a physical damage requirement for the TESTBANK rule. Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co. v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1995). Here, CAT shut in and reduced the production of power of its hydroelectric facility to allow removal of the barge and prevent further permanent damage to its facility.  Without these acts, CAT would have run the risk of incurring physical damage to its hydroelectric station and, therefore, triggered the right to recover economic losses. 

The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that the presence of the barge in the intake channel caused physical damage to hydroelectric facility by obstructing the supply of water, which was critical to station operations. The barge’s interference with the flow of water was considered an invasion to CAT’s proprietary interest. The Appellate Court also held that actions taken by CAT to shut in and reduce power production at its facility to prevent further damage satisfied the TESTBANK rule requirement. Based on this reasoning, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s granting of motion for summary judgment on the issue of economic loss rule and remanded the case back to district court for further proceedings. In this case, the Fifth Circuit illustrates that a party may be entitled to claim economic losses without demonstrating actual physical damage to property. A plaintiff may recover economic losses upon a showing of an invasion, intrusion or interference of a proprietary interest, rather than just physical damage to the property.  The physical damage requirement can also be met if the plaintiff has undertaken physical acts to mitigate the damages that would have been resulted from the intrusion or invasion. 

If you would like to receive a copy of this decision or wish to contact me, you may do so by writing to me at miamipandi@comcast.net or motero@houckanderson.com.

2d DCA Rules that Comprehensive Liability Exclusion for Injuries to Children Ambiguous

June 27, 2011

In NORTH POINTE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. M & S TRACTOR SERVICES, INC., 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1365a (Fla. 2d DCA June 24, 2011), the Second District Court of Appeals of Florida has found that insurance policy which states that it does not apply to “ ‘Bodily Injury' sustained by the spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of any employee of any insured, or of a contractor, or of an employee of a contractor of any insured as a consequence of ‘bodily injury' to such employee, contractor, or employee of such contractor, arising out of and in the course of such employment or retention by or for any insured” was properly found by trial court to be ambiguous. The court further found that the trial court properly found that coverage was not excluded for injuries to the son of an employee of the named insured who was injured when he fell from a tractor being operated by the employee in the course and scope of his employment with the named insured.

North Pointe issued this policy relying on ISO standard forms. The main section of the policy is identified as CG-00-001-12-04 under a 2003 copyright. The critical endorsement, entitled “Exclusion of Injury to Employees, Contractors and Employees of Contractors,” is identified as NP-08-16-02-06. I have considered this policy language is several coverage matters and have been of the opinion that the Florida courts would find this clause ambiguous. Unfortunately, I have been proven correct. 

If you are interested in receiving a full copy of this decision, please write me at miamipandi@comcast.net, motero@houckanderson.com or via LinkedIn at 

http://www.linkedin.com/in/michelleoterovaldes.

Ex-port Commissioner Ralph Kennedy Pleads Guilty to Corruption Charges

June 27, 2011

The Florida Today reports that Ralph Kennedy, a former Canaveral Port Authority commissioner, pleaded guilty on June 21, 2011 to two felony counts of public corruption as part of an agreement with prosecutors.

Brevard County Judge Robert Burger sentenced the 55-year-old Kennedy, owner of a Merritt Island construction company, to four years probation and ordered him to pay $3,059 to Florida’s Office of Statewide Prosecution to cover expenses. The plea followed months of negotiations between the Office of Statewide Prosecution and Kennedy’s attorney, Brian Onek, and ends a 20-month legal saga that ended Kennedy’s 19-year stint as a port commissioner.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement arrested Kennedy in November, charging him with unlawful compensation or reward for official behavior and conspiracy to commit unlawful compensation or reward for official behavior, both felonies. Investigators said Kennedy used his position as a public official to advance business projects of friends and political supporters. Kennedy resigned from his seat as a Canaveral Port Authority commissioner in October 2009 as news of the FDLE investigation of activities at Port Canaveral began to surface.

My thanks goes out to Trish Olney for alerting me to this news. If you would like to contact me, you may reach me at miamipandi@comcast.net, motero@houckanderson.com or via LinkedIn at

http://www.linkedin.com/in/michelleoterovaldes.

U.S. Supreme Court Rules that Carrier Negligence Does Not Incorporate Proximate Cause Standard

June 24, 2011

In CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. MCBRIDE, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S1197a (Jun. 23, 2011), the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which the Jones Act incorporates, does not incorporate “proximate cause” standards developed in nonstatutory common-law tort actions. The Court also held that it is not error in FELA cases to refuse a jury instruction charge embracing stock proximate cause terminology and that the proper jury charge in FELA cases simply tracks language Congress employed, informing juries that a defendant railroad caused or contributed to a railroad employee's injury if railroad's negligence played any part in bringing about the injury.

In summary, Respondent McBride, a locomotive engineer with petitioner CSX Transportation, Inc., an interstate railroad, sustained a debilitating hand injury while switching railroad cars. He filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which holds railroads liable for employees' injuries “resulting in whole or in part from [carrier] negligence.” 45 U.S.C. §51. McBride alleged that CSX negligently (1) required him to use unsafe switching equipment and (2) failed to train him to operate that equipment. A verdict for McBride would be in order, the District Court instructed, if the jury found that CSX's negligence “caused or contributed to” his injury. The court declined CSX's request for additional charges requiring McBride to “show that . . . [CSX's] negligence was a proximate cause of the injury” and defining “proximate cause” as “any cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury complained of.” Instead, relying onRogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, the court gave the Seventh Circuit's pattern FELA instruction: “Defendant ‘caused or contributed to' Plaintiffs injury if Defendant's negligence played a part -- no matter how small -- in bringing about the injury.” The jury returned a verdict for McBride. On appeal, CSX renewed its objection to the failure to instruct on proximate cause, now defining the phrase to require a “direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” The appeals court, however, approved the District Court's instruction and affirmed its judgment for McBride. Because Rogers had relaxed the proximate cause requirement in FELA cases, the court said, an instruction that simply paraphrased Rogers' language could not be declared erroneous. Held:The judgment is affirmed.

While this is a railroad case, the Jones Act incorporates FELA by reference. See Miller v. American Dredging Co., 510 U.S. 443 (1994). Thus, judicial interpretations of FELA also apply to Jones Act cases. This case makes it crystal clear that attempts to argue the doctrine of proximate cause should apply in seaman's cases will be rejected by any court asked to consider the issue. 

Should you wish a copy of the complete decision, please feel free to contact me atmiamipandi@comcast.net, motero@houckanderson.com or via LinkedIn at 

http://www.linkedin.com/in/michelleoterovaldes.

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